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If I had a world of my own, everything would be nonsense.
Nothing would be what it is, because everything would be what
it isn’t. And contrary wise, what is, it wouldn’t be. And what it
wouldn’t be, it would. You see?
—Alice in Wonderland
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On July 2, 1964, President Lyndon Johnson sat in the East Room of the
White House. With Martin Luther King Jr. standing behind him, President
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law. President Johnson
proclaimed that the Act would “eliminate the last vestiges of injustice in
our beloved country.”1
This historic law prohibited discrimination in a wide range of American
life, including at the ballot box, in restaurants, and in hotels. Title VII of
that law prohibited discrimination in the American workplace. For the
first time in the United States, it became unlawful for many employers
to discriminate against workers because of their race, sex, religion, color,
and national origin.2 Congress later passed laws making age and disability
discrimination illegal.
This book shows how federal judges approach discrimination cases
brought by workers who are protected under these laws. Over time,
judges have created dozens of frameworks, rules, and inferences to help
them analyze discrimination cases. But all of these frameworks, rules, and
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inferences do not help judges determine whether discrimination actually
happened.
Instead, this analysis has created an alternative reality. Here, no discrimination happens when a supervisor gropes a woman’s breast, so long
as the supervisor only does it one or two times. In this world of federal
discrimination law, some judges declare it is legal and not discriminatory
for an employer to give a worker a negative evaluation based on the color
of her skin. This is not discrimination. In this alternative universe, when
a supervisor calls a woman a “cunt,” a “whore,” and a “bitch,” this is not
evidence that the supervisor is biased. When a supervisor says, “all blacks
are lazy” or uses vile racial epithets, this is not evidence of racism. These
are simply stray remarks that the judge can disregard. The book tells the
stories of workers and how courts dismissed their claims.

1. RACHEL, TINA, ANTHONY, AND JOHN
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To introduce you to this world of discrimination law, we start with three
stories based on cases in the U.S. federal courts.
Rachel is black. Her supervisor, Bill, is white. Bill accidentally copies
Rachel on an email in which he states he will never give a black employee
a positive evaluation. Later, Bill gives Rachel a negative evaluation. Is it
possible that Bill’s conduct is discrimination? According to one federal
appellate court, the answer is no.3 The negative evaluation does not count
as discrimination.
Tina is a cashier. Tina sued her employer for sexual harassment. In her
suit, she presented evidence that her supervisor asked her out on dates
many times, even offering “financial assistance” if she would agree.4 He
once “removed from his pants a large bottle of wine, offered Plaintiff a
drink, and then asked her to join him later at a local hotel where they
could have a ‘good time.’ ” She also claimed that on at least two occasions,
he touched her breasts and touched her buttocks once. The court dismissed Tina’s claim, ruling that what happened to Tina was not sexual
harassment.
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Anthony and John are African American men. They both sought promotions at a company to become shift managers. Neither received a promotion.5 Instead, the white plant manager promoted two white men. The
plant manager admitted that he had not followed the written qualifications
for the shift manager job when he made the decisions about whom to promote.6 Moreover, Anthony and John provided evidence that the manager
referred to them as “boy.” They also had evidence, though disputed by the
employer, that they were better qualified than the white employees who
were selected for the promotions.7 They also submitted evidence that no
black worker had ever been promoted to the shift manager position that
they had sought.8
Though jury trials are rare, Anthony’s and John’s cases made it to a jury.
The jury found the employer discriminated against Anthony and John
based on their race. Despite this verdict, the judge who presided in the
case decided there was insufficient evidence of discrimination and dismissed the cases, finding for the employer. The judge noted that using the
term “boy” when referring to Anthony and John was not “probative of
racial animus.”9
The appellate court that reviewed the case agreed with the trial court on
a number of matters. Calling African American men “boy” was not evidence of racial discrimination, and the jury was wrong when it found discrimination in Anthony’s case. However, the appeals court ordered a new
trial for John, finding that John had more evidence to support his case.10
In these cases, the courts made a decision: what happened to Rachel,
Tina, and Anthony was not discrimination. In cases like Rachel’s and
Tina’s, the judges were so sure of the correct outcome that they were willing to dismiss the cases before they ever reached juries. In Anthony’s case,
the judges felt comfortable ignoring a jury’s verdict. According to these
judges, there was only one right answer in each case: the employer had not
discriminated against the employees. The worker should lose the case and
the employer should win. These are not isolated cases. Searches of federal
cases reveal case after case with similar results, where judges dismiss cases
brought by workers who allege they are subject to racial epithets or when
workers have evidence, for example, that that their supervisors thought

4

U ne q ual

Ox

for

dU

niv
ers

ity

Pr

ess

they were too old to do their jobs.11 Courts dismiss cases when women
allege that their boss or their coworkers repeatedly touched their breasts
or buttocks, where supervisors repeatedly asked them out on dates or for
sexual favors, or where they were repeatedly the victim of unwanted sexualized comments and gestures.12
The results of these cases are surprising, especially when you consider
the traditional rules of litigation. Under these norms, judges decide legal
issues, and when there is a dispute about facts, the jury decides. Federal
judges are not supposed to pick winners and losers in cases where the
facts are contested. If a case presents facts suggesting discrimination, a
jury should decide the outcome. If a case is a close call, it is supposed to
go to a jury.
As you will see, federal judges do not apply the traditional rules of
litigation to discrimination cases. Instead, judges have created a new set
of rules. These rules are not neutral. They favor employers and disfavor
workers.
Judges have constructed a complex system of legal frameworks, doctrines, and evidentiary rules that allow them to dismiss claims before trial.
Even when a case makes it to trial, and a jury finds that discrimination has
occurred, trial court and appellate judges use these same legal frameworks
to overturn the jury’s verdict. In fact, discrimination cases are some of the
most disfavored cases on the federal docket. Judges dismiss these claims at
rates far higher than most other kinds of claims.
This book shows how the methods that courts use to evaluate discrimination cases are flawed. These methods do not reliably allow courts to
determine whether discrimination occurred in a particular case. Instead,
the procedures courts use allow them to declare that no discrimination
happened, even when the worker has evidence that her race, her sex, or
other protected trait caused her to lose her job or otherwise negatively
affected her position.
We start from a simple premise. When a worker presents evidence that
he or she faced a negative consequence because of his or her race, sex, or
other protected trait, a jury should hear the case, consider the contested
evidence, and decide whether discrimination occurred.13 At a jury trial,
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the employee (plaintiff) can put forward evidence to convince the jury
that the employer discriminated. The employer (defendant) can challenge
the worker’s evidence and try to convince the jury that the plaintiff has
not presented sufficient evidence of discrimination and has not proven by
a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was discriminated against.
The stories in this book show that judges have narrowed the definition of discrimination. When a male supervisor touches a woman’s
breast and buttocks, the supervisor may have engaged in a form of
discrimination more precisely referred to as sexual harassment. When
a supervisor calls black men “boy,” race discrimination might have
occurred. When a supervisor says that he would never give workers
of certain religions good evaluations and then gives them bad evaluations, that might be religious discrimination. In each of these cases,
a jury could determine that race, sex, or religion negatively affected
the worker’s job. This book shows why judges should not dismiss these
cases before or after a jury trial.

2. THE SUPER-S TATUTE
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There are three federal laws that serve as the cornerstone protections
against employment discrimination—Title VII, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, and the Americans with Disabilities Act.
Congress passed Title VII in 1964. Title VII prohibits employers from
discriminating against workers based on race, sex, color, national origin, and religion. It has had a profound impact in reshaping workplace
norms and opportunities. Title VII is so important that scholars William
Eskridge and John Ferejohn labeled it a “super-statute.”14 To attain super-
statute status, the law must embrace a great principle. For Title VII, that
principle is combatting employment discrimination.
When Congress deliberated about Title VII, a question arose about
whether age should also be a protected class. Although Congress was
not ready to add age as a protected category in 1964, it did so three years
later when it passed the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).
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The ADEA protects workers 40 years old and older from age discrimination. Several years later, in 1990, Congress enacted the Americans with
Disabilities Act, which expanded discrimination law to cover people with
disabilities. Workers can also file claims for race discrimination under 42
U.S.C. § 1981.
Taken together, these laws are supposed to provide a level playing field
for workers in these protected categories, and they have had some positive
effect in limiting workplace discrimination. In the past, companies had
policies that segregated workers. Black employees could hold only certain
jobs—often the jobs that paid less.15 Some companies also had policies that
required women to quit their jobs when they married or became pregnant.16 State laws prohibited women from working at night.17 Thanks in
part to the passage of these laws, all of these actions are now illegal.

3. THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
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With the election of President Barack Obama in 2008, there were new
discussions about America’s progress toward equality including entering a
new post-racial era. In this allegedly post-racial era, Americans have transcended the legacy of race discrimination. Similarly, many people believe
that other types of discrimination are rare and only happen at the hands
of a few bad actors.
The American workplace is far less equal than many people would like
to believe.18 One study by Professor Devah Pager19 shows the magnitude
of the inequality. Professor Pager sent out white and black testers to apply
for jobs. During the application process, some of the applicants indicated
they had no criminal history while others suggested that they did have
a criminal record. Professor Pager’s study found that white applicants
without criminal records received callback interviews for jobs 34 percent
of the time20 while black applicants without criminal records received
callback interviews only 14 percent of the time.21 White applicants with
criminal records received callback interviews 17 percent of the time22
while black applicants with criminal records received callback interviews
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only 5 percent of the time.23 So white men with criminal records actually
received more callbacks than African American men without a criminal
record.24
Race matters in hiring. Depending on the study, white applicants were
“anywhere from 1.5 to 5 times more likely to receive a callback or job offer
relative to equally qualified black applicants.”25 Over time, the unemployment rate for African American workers, which may be affected by these
racialized hiring practices, has typically been about twice the rate of white
Americans.26
Women and people of color are underrepresented in many jobs in certain industries and in certain positions of power. In 2015, CNN reported
that there were only five black CEOs among America’s 500 largest companies.27 When Microsoft promoted Satya Nadella to CEO in 2014, Fortune
declared that he was “one minority exec in a sea of white.”28
Women are also underrepresented. The New York Times reported
in 2015 that “[f]ewer large companies are run by women than by men
named John … .”29 In 2014, the New York Times reported that seven out
of ten people working at Google were men.30 At Google, three out of
thirty-six of its top-ranking executives were women, and 83 percent of
its engineers were men.31 Similar numbers were reported at other large
tech companies.32 Additionally, women hold fewer than 20 percent of the
board member seats at companies listed in the Standard and Poor’s 500
Index.33
In the legal system, people of color and women are similarly underrepresented. In 2015, only about 2 percent of partners at large firms were
Hispanic or Latino, and about the same number were African American.34
In some states, fewer than 3 percent of state judges are persons of color.35
Women are also underrepresented. Since the late 1980s, even though
women make up anywhere from 40 to 50 percent of American law
school graduates, fewer than 20 percent of equity partners at law firms
are women.36 Only 21 percent of leaders in corporate legal departments at
Fortune 500 companies are women.37 Almost 80 percent of the deans of
American law schools are men.38 Only 24 percent of federal judges39 and
27 percent of state court judges are women.40
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Race and sex also affect pay. In 2014, women who worked full-time earned
about 82 percent of what men earned.41 These numbers become worse when
the worker is a woman of color. For example, Hispanic women’s median
salaries in 2014 were only 61.2 percent of white men’s median salaries.42
There is debate about how much of the wage gap is due to factors other
than discrimination, such as hours worked and career choice. There is
also discussion about the actual size of the sex-based wage differential. No
matter how you parse the data, there is an unexplained wage gap between
women and men.43 For example, one study took into account students’
“college major, occupation, economic sector, hours worked, months
unemployed since graduation, GPA, type of undergraduate institution,
institution selectivity, age, geographical region, and marital status.”44 The
study found a 7 percent difference in the earnings of male and female college graduates one year after graduation that was not explained by any of
these factors.45 The study further found that ten years after graduation,
this unexplained wage gap widens to 12 percent.
It is difficult to determine how much bias contributes to these continuing disparities. Other factors, such as class, access to quality education, and
societal expectations related to career choice, likely play roles. Nonetheless,
the previously mentioned studies show that these factors do not completely
explain why there is still so much inequality in American workplaces.
Despite these studies, there is an emerging story about the role that
bias plays in this continuing inequality. Under the new conventional wisdom, “old school” race and sex discrimination is rare. A few bad actors
may intentionally discriminate against workers, but companies work hard
to ferret out these bad apples. Writing in 2001, Professor Michael Selmi
noted: “It seems that the general consensus today is that the role discrimination plays in contemporary America has been sharply diminished.”46
The New York Times quoted a tech executive as saying: “This is a pretty
genteel environment, and you don’t usually see outright manifestations
of bias… . Occasionally you’ll have some idiot do something stupid and
hurtful, and I like to fire those people.”47
According to the popular narrative, courts provide robust protections
against discrimination in cases alleging traditional discrimination. Within
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the small group of traditional cases that still exist, so the story goes, the
legal system does a good job of adjudicating these cases. Judges police
egregious forms of discrimination48 and separate the plausible cases from
the meritless ones.49 In these traditional cases, judges are largely correct
in deciding which cases should proceed to juries.50 The cases judges dismiss are cases that a litigant would never win. Under this narrative, federal
judges are committed to combating traditional discrimination. This judicial commitment is strong, and courts will not interfere with protecting
the core anti-discrimination law.51
So, how does bias continue to affect the workplace? In the new narrative, workplace inequity continues to exist because of complex phenomena.
Scholars have argued that workplace culture and unconscious bias cause
race and sex discrimination.52 As Professor Tristin Green writes: “Race,
sex, and other protected group characteristics will continue to factor into
employment decisions, but the decisions are more likely to be driven by
unconscious biases and stereotypes operating within a facilitating organizational context than by conscious animus operating in isolation.”53 Legal
scholar Amy Wax has noted: “Some commentators have gone so far as to
suggest that, as overt bigotry has waned in response to antidiscrimination
laws and evolving social mores, unintentional or ‘unconscious’ discrimination has become the most pervasive and important form of bias operating
in society today.”54
Unconscious biases reinforce inequality: these are the “hidden, reflexive
preferences that shape most people’s worldviews, and that can profoundly
affect how welcoming and open a workplace is to different people and
ideas.”55 A supervisor may believe he acts in a neutral way, though he may
unconsciously be affected by societal stereotypes about race, sex, or age.56
Commentator Nicholas Kristof has discussed the “biased brain,”
arguing that we can better understand the roots of racial division in
America by understanding this unconscious bias.57 Fortune magazine
has reported: “Equality is a worthy goal—but it’s tough to achieve when
unconscious bias so pervades the American workplace.”58 Large companies like Google have responded by embracing diversity training that
focuses on identifying unconscious biases.
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According to the popular narrative, courts handle traditional discrimination claims well, but they are struggling with more complex ideas like unconscious bias. Courts restrict the law where discrimination is not evident.
Courts may not be able to adeptly fix problems such as unconscious bias,
and it may not even be a good idea to hold employers liable for unconscious
bias.59 Legal scholar Amy Wax has been skeptical of efforts to use the legal
system to this end, arguing that there are “no known methods for effectively
controlling unconscious bias in the workplace” and that courts would not be
particularly good at determining whether workplace decisions resulted from
the “intermittent, subtle, and elusive phenomenon” of unconscious bias.60
Under this narrative, there is little or nothing left for courts to enforce
because judges either cannot fix the problems of unconscious bias or
would be bad at fixing them. If judges are dismissing lawsuits, these cases
are likely newer kinds of discrimination about which judges feel less comfortable and for which there is no overt evidence that race, sex, or other
protected traits directly played a role in an employment decision.
We contest this narrative. In this book, we will show that the federal
judiciary often fails to decide traditional discrimination cases in a fair
manner. Judges have created a whole host of frameworks, inferences, and
doctrines that they use to dismiss cases and keep them away from juries,
including cases that present evidence of discrimination.
Modern workplace inequality may very well be caused, in part, by
unconscious bias, but this is not all that is happening. Judges do not protect the core of the discrimination statutes. When workers present evidence of traditional discrimination, judges often dismiss their cases.

4. INTERNAL LIMITS

There is another popular myth about American discrimination law. It is
easy to win a discrimination lawsuit and also easy to win a very large verdict against an employer. The reality is much different. Congress placed
specific limits in the federal discrimination statutes that are different in
kind or degree from almost any other type of claim, outside of claims made
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by prisoners. The discrimination laws on the books, the ones created by
Congress, already contain important limits that balance the interests of
workers, employers, and the courts. When the courts add on doctrines
and rules to restrict claims, they limit an already narrow cause of action.
Congress limits employment discrimination claims in three important
ways. First, a person alleging discrimination may not immediately go to
court and file a claim. Instead, the person must present her claim to either
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or a similar
state agency. This requirement—to file first with an administrative agency
before going to court—is an additional legal requirement. When a person
has almost any other kind of claim, he can simply go to court and present
his grievance.
The EEOC is a federal agency charged with enforcing many federal civil
rights laws. A person alleging discrimination submits a document to the
agency called a Charge of Discrimination. The Charge generally describes
the worker’s allegations against the employer.
The charge-filing process reduces the number of claims filed in court.
After a charge is filed, the EEOC or state agency may investigate an
employee’s claims, possibly eliminating the need for later litigation in the
courts. The EEOC also provides a voluntary mediation system to help the
parties try to resolve the underlying claim.
As one court noted: “Exhaustion of administrative remedies is central to
Title VII’s statutory scheme because it provides the EEOC the first opportunity to investigate discriminatory practices and enables it to perform
its roles of obtaining voluntary compliance and promoting conciliatory
efforts.”61 But the discrimination statutes do not require that the EEOC
fully investigate every claim or that the EEOC make a decision about the
merits of each claim. In most of the cases that later go to court, the EEOC
makes no decision about whether discrimination happened or not. Rather,
the EEOC most often issues a Notice of Right to Sue letter. This notice simply declares that the EEOC process is finished, without making any decision about whether the employer violated the law.
In addition to the requirement that applicants or employees must go
to the agency first, Congress limits the scope of discrimination law by
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requiring discrimination claims to be filed within a short period of time
after discrimination happens. A person alleging discrimination must submit her Charge of Discrimination within 180 days or 300 days of the discriminatory act.62 After the EEOC or state agency issues its Right to Sue
letter, an employee has 90 days to file a claim in court.63 The time limits
imposed by the discrimination statutes are short compared to limits for
other types of claims. By comparison, many states give plaintiffs two or
three years to file negligence claims.64 And some litigants can wait ten
years before filing suit.65
Even though the EEOC does not make a determination for most claims
of whether discrimination occurred, the requirement that a potential litigant go to the EEOC or a state agency within a particular time frame limits
the reach of discrimination law. If the worker misses any of the administrative filing deadlines, she usually cannot raise her claim in court. This is
true even if the worker otherwise has a good discrimination case.
Workers also may lose the right to file their claims forever if they tell
the EEOC about some of their claims, but not all of them. A worker can
only file a claim in court that is “reasonably related” to the facts submitted to the EEOC. For example, a worker may go to the EEOC and
claim he was terminated because of his race. The worker may not realize that the facts also support a claim for retaliation. If the worker does
not mention retaliation to the EEOC, he may not be able to later pursue
that claim in court.66 This requirement to submit all potential claims to
the EEOC applies even if the worker did not realize he was required to
do this and even if the worker did not understand the different types of
legal claims.
Discrimination statutes are also limited in a third important way.
Congress placed limits on the types and amounts of monetary relief that a
court can award under the discrimination statutes.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) has the most
restrictive damages. Under the ADEA, a worker can receive the wages and
benefits she lost as a result of age discrimination. If she proves the age discrimination was willful, she can obtain an additional award of damages,
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but the ADEA limits the amount of this additional award to the amount
of backpay.67
Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) allow employees to receive wages and benefits lost due to discrimination. They also
allow workers to obtain punitive damages, which are only available if
the employee proves the employer discriminated with malice or reckless
indifference to the law.68 Additional damages, such as damages for emotional distress, are also available.
Title VII caps the total combined compensatory and punitive damages
that a plaintiff may recover based on the number of employees employed
by the defendant.69 The highest cap, which applies to employers with
more than 500 employees, is $300,000.70 An employer with 100 or fewer
employees only can be liable for up to $50,000 under the cap. This cap
does not apply to lost wages and benefits. The damages cap is fixed. It
is not adjusted upward if the employer engaged in especially egregious
discrimination. Moreover, the cap has not changed since 1991 when it was
enacted, and it is not adjusted for inflation.71
Congress also limited discrimination law in other ways. Smaller
employers are outside the reach of federal discrimination law. Under
Title VII and the ADA, an employer must have at least fifteen employees to be liable, while under the ADEA, an employer must have at least
twenty employees to be liable for age discrimination.72 Additionally, not
all people who work are covered under the laws. The person bringing a
discrimination claim must be an individual who falls within the statutory
protections, such as an employee or former employee.73 Often, federal
discrimination law does not protect volunteers, independent contractors,
and other similarly situated people.74 The laws also provide employers
with various defenses that either eliminate or reduce potential discrimination liability.75
The book describes how federal courts further limit the reach of discrimination law and why they do it. The judiciary, over time, has created a
series of complex frameworks to evaluate discrimination cases. Supporting
these frameworks are a host of judge-made procedural and evidentiary
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rules. Judges apply these frameworks and rules to evaluate discrimination
claims. Unfortunately, the analysis does not accurately determine whether
discrimination happened. In many instances, they actually distract courts
away from the central question in many discrimination cases: was the
worker treated differently because of her race, sex, or other trait.

